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Introduction
On Saturday, September 15, 2007, eBay
posted one of its most bizarre listings: Bel-
gium was up for sale. “For Sale: Belgium, a
Kingdom in three parts . . . free premium: the
king and his court (costs not included)” read the
ad, whose author later noted that there was also
the small matter of the $300 billion national
debt that the buyer would incur. (“Disgruntled
Voter . . .”) This mock auction, a creative expres-
sion of voter frustration, came just prior to
the 100-day mark of the state’s failure to form a
government following the June 10 elections.
This was only the most recent mockery
that the Belgian public has endured. In Decem-
ber of 2006, a TV broadcast now known as the
Belgian breakup hoax rocked the small country
and reverberated in Belgian embassies around
the world. State-owned Walloon broadcast com-
pany RTBF interrupted regular programming
to air an elaborately crafted segment depicting
Flemish nationalists and fleeing monarchs;
for 30 minutes, viewers believed that Flanders
had seceded and declared independence from
Belgium and that the king and queen had fled.
The Belgian national newspaper Le Soir fol-
lowed up the following morning with the
doomsday headline “Belgium Died Last Night.”
(Bilefsky) Widely believed and widely con-
demned following the clarification that the pro-
gram was fictitious, RTBF claimed that the
report was an attempt to stir up much needed
debate regarding the future of Belgium.
Troubling times are nothing new to Bel-
gians, the latter term in itself a loaded one.
Though it is common to anthropomorphize
states and refer to them as singular entities, 
Belgium is more often metaphorically expressed
in terms of a marriage, and not a happy one at
that. As Robert Mnookin observed, “The nation’s
founding was . . . not a love match but an
arranged marriage between spouses who had lit-
tle in common” (p. 106), and ostensibly have
even less in common today. Such conditions
have led The Economist, among others, to assert
that “a praline divorce is in order.” (“Time to Call
it a Day . . .”)
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Today’s prospective divorcées would be
Flanders and Wallonia, which in 1932 retreated
to separate ends of the house, so to speak,
with a legalized territorial demarcation line
establishing the Flemish region in the north and
the Walloon region in the south; in the nine-
teenth century, the parties in question may have
been the Catholics and Liberals, or Catholics
and Socialists. In effect, “Belgium’s society
and polity have always been deeply split along
several dimensions” (Heisler, p. 33), so one need
only know the time period to know not whether
there was a disagreement at hand, but rather
whom the disagreement concerned. Historian
Tony Judt goes so far as to make the argu-
ment that at the state’s inception “it [Bel-
gium] was held together not by any common
feeling of Belgianness but by hierarchically
organized social groups . . . that substituted
for the nation-state.” (p. 2) Thus, in a state
whose cleavages predate the state itself by 1,500
years (Heisler, p. 33) and whose differences —
be they religious, socioeconomic, cultural, or
linguistic — rather than similarities seem to
tenuously hold it together, one must wonder:
Does the Belgian state really matter?
Given Belgium’s track record of catalyzing
ethnic strife and turning out disaffected authors
who refer to their homeland as “that country
that no longer exists” (de Heusch, p. 13), there
is ostensibly little reason to go to the trouble
of maintaining a state with no national identity.
Apart from the monarchy, soccer, and perhaps
beer (Mnookin, p. 113), the Flemish and the
Walloons have nothing in common. The idea
of a shared history is hardly worthy of mention;
and were it not for the infamous “Brussels ques-
tion,” the regions may well have gone on their
separate, autonomous ways by now. Authors
from nearly every decade since Belgium’s inde-
pendence have written a doomsday forecast of
an imminent split; yet the state somehow per-
sists. Its remarkable resilience in the face of
innumerable domestic clashes indicates that the
state structure must serve some important func-
tion whose absence would leave the regions
comparatively worse-off without it. The frame-
work suits the interests of the Flemish and Wal-
loons, who thus far have opted for unity over
separatism because they recognize the need
for the state to act as a forum for compromise
and a protector of rights. Granted, Belgium may
not parallel the conventional notion of state-
hood. But in today’s post-modern world that
is moving further away from Westphalian ideals,
that might not be such a bad thing.
This article will trace Belgium’s history
of divisiveness and the different measures each
side has taken to push its particular agenda. The
record shows a continuous conflict between eth-
nic groups, often leaving disgruntled citizens
and a precarious state structure in its wake.
However, the fact remains that the country
has stayed intact; and the final analysis suggests
that this arrangement, while problematic, will
endure due to the current makeup of the inter-
national system1 and the benefits this struc-
ture still offers its bickering factions.
Nascent Statehood
Belgium came into existence at a time
when it was still en vogue to become a nation-
state in Europe. In reality, the term “nation-
state” is a misnomer in this instance and has
never truly applied to Belgium’s situation. After
all, the formation of the United Kingdom of
the Netherlands in 1815 lumped two cultur-
ally and linguistically distinct territories — now
the Netherlands and Belgium — into one unit,
done at the behest of the great powers looking
for a buffer state to prevent another war of
Napoleonic proportions. Shortly thereafter,
the unlikely bedfellows of Flanders and Wallo-
nia formed an uncharacteristic Liberal-Catholic
coalition to win independence from the Dutch,
and the constitutional monarchy of Belgium
was established in 1831. Fittingly, the two com-
munities don’t celebrate the national holiday on
the same day: Walloons commemorate July 21
for King Leopold I’s ascension to the Belgian
throne, while Flemings, by decree in 1973,
observe July 11 in honor of a Flemish victory
over a French king in the Middle Ages. (Judt,
p. 6)
The forced marriage was an unhappy one
from the beginning, and the newly constructed
14
1The nature of the international system is still one
of sovereign nation-states, an arrangement established by
the great powers of Europe in the Peace of Westphalia in
1648. However, recent trends of globalization and increas-
ing regional interdependence are eroding state sovereignty.
The situation in Belgium will be examined in light of
these concepts later in this article.
state did nothing to intermingle the linguisti-
cally-divided populations. The nineteenth-
century politicized division, however, had less
to do with language and territory than religious
beliefs (or a lack thereof). Initially a two-party
system comprised of Catholics and Liberals, the
small country saw the addition of a third group,
the Socialists, by the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Each represented more than mere ideolog-
ical preferences of citizens, but rather an iden-
tity unto itself. Describing the extent to which
the parties institutionalized societal divisions,
Heisler notes: 
These orientations came to embody most
aspects of life, not only political, economic,
or religious issues. Each of the three seg-
ments of the population established orga-
nizational infrastructures to match world-
views; therefore, it became possible for
those who identified with the Catholic,
Liberal, or Socialist perspectives . . . to
avoid extensive and intimate contact with
people of a different persuasion. (pp.
36–37)
Thus began the so-called “segmentation” of Bel-
gian society. In a sense, this early compartmen-
talization of the population set a precedent for
the modern federalization of Belgium, with sep-
arate regions, governments, media, and indeed
lifestyles — each distinct and removed from the
other.
On the heels of the religious cleavage
between the Catholics and the Liberals came yet
another division that predates the contempo-
rary Belgian situation, one whose roots were
socioeconomic in nature. At the beginning of
the nineteenth century, the southern region
of Wallonia, replete with coal and other natu-
ral resources, underwent one of the earliest
industrial revolutions in Europe and conse-
quently became quite wealthy. This status took
on a greater significance within the state of Bel-
gium, as Wallonia’s wealth was glaringly appar-
ent in contrast with poor agrarian Flanders. 
Oftentimes wealth breeds power, and that
axiom held true in Belgium’s case as well. The
Flemish populace took on second-class status
not only in terms of riches but in political,
cultural, and linguistic terms as well. The
francophone elite — both Walloons and privi-
leged Flanders natives who spoke French —
dominated the positions of power throughout
the country. The elite of Flanders had French
educations as well, and for this reason were dis-
similar from the rest of the masses inhabiting
the same region. A command of the French lan-
guage was seen as the only way for advancement
within Belgian society, and consequently the
Flemish2 language was relegated to a low rank
as a symbol of backwardness. Publicly, ambi-
tious Flemings denied their own heritage and
assumed varying degrees of the francophone
culture, as well as the language. This led to
the adoption of such common phrases as
“French in the parlor, Flemish in the kitchen,”
as well as the grudging acceptance of the late
nineteenth century Flemings that “it was nec-
essary to cease being Flemish in order to
become Belgian.” (Heisler, p. 38) This mindset
only served to temporarily repress the regional
identity, as no greater state identity ever truly
gelled.
A Push for Parity
This class divide, originally more of an eco-
nomic issue, segued into the beginnings of the
ethnic divisions of the present day. In the mid-
nineteenth century, Flemings in the intellectual
and professional sectors began the push for
parity between the French and Flemish lan-
guages and cultures, an effort that came to be
known as the Flemish Movement. Among the
movement’s first objectives was to eliminate the
numerous Dutch dialects for the sake of one
standardized language, necessary in order to
achieve parity with the linguistically unified fran-
cophones. Embedded in this ideal of language
homogenization was the recognized need for 
a true Flemish elite — one that spoke Flemish
rather than French — and thus a need for
improvements in Flemish education, especially
at higher levels. Political aims were secondary in
nature and served mainly as the vehicle to imple-
ment the aforementioned changes in the state’s
linguistic structure and educational system.
(Stephenson, p. 503) Modest success came in
1898 when Flemish was declared Belgium’s sec-
ond official language, a ruling that was more
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2In the Flanders region of Belgium, both the citizens
and the language are characterized as “Flemish.” The Flem-
ish language is the same as the Dutch language, differen-
tiated by name only according to the country where it is 
spoken.
de jure than de facto: most of official state
business continued to be conducted in French.
More substantial progress came for the
Flemings in the decades to follow. For hundreds
of years, a virtual barrier had separated the
Dutch-speakers to the north from the French-
speakers in the south; and though it had
remained relatively static, the boundary had
never been officially recognized by the Belgian
government. Finally, in 1932 the demarcation
line became law; and, more significantly, a
1962 Parliamentary decree established regional
unilingualism in Flanders and Wallonia and
bilingualism for Brussels and state institu-
tions. (Dunn, p. 146) The demarcation line
now had the effect of determining the official
language of the regions: outside of the country’s
capital, Flemish, not French, reigned supreme
in Flanders. This effectively sent a message to
the French-speaking Flemish elite: learn to
speak Flemish — or leave. The principle of bilin-
gualism in government further tempered fran-
cophone influence, as seats for Flemish-speakers
opened.
Laws in Action
Initially, these changes looked better on
paper than in reality. Through much of the
1950s and 1960s, the Flemish fought the gov-
ernment over the issue of “Frenchification”
(Dunn, p. 147), the creeping influence of the
francophones on Flemings in the culture and
educational facilities within Brussels. Even
today the Flemish complaint of not feeling at
home in their own capital rings true; earlier
generations made the same protest. The
Catholics and secularists had a long-standing
battle regarding state subsidization of educa-
tion, an issue the government dealt with in
the 1950s by passing the “School Pact,” which
simply allowed for greater allocation of funds to
both groups. Now the same fight was being
played out by regional foes, with the Flemish
agitating for education equality with the Wal-
loons. This period was marked by what Dunn
calls “the decline in specifically religious or
philosophical conflicts between political parties”
and allowed for “the rise of a more pragmatic
interest-based style of politics,” i.e. the lin-
guistic issue, which would henceforth remain
the focal point of Belgian life. (p. 147)
Linguistic-driven politics contributed to
much of the tumult seen across Belgium in
the 1960s. This political shift must be seen in
the context of the turn of economic events
that occurred in the previous decade, when
heavy industry in Wallonia fell on hard times
and unemployment skyrocketed. The North saw
the opposite effect, and for the first time in state
history the Flemish usurped the Walloon’s claim
to economic superiority. (Heisler, p. 39) Success
in Flanders wiped away the shame formerly
felt by the Flemish in the days of their second-
class citizenry, and they began to agitate for
political parity as well. The Flemish wanted
the same government privileges that the Wal-
loons had long enjoyed; they consequently
pushed for an equal division of state offices
and subsidies, and the same level of regional
control in Flanders that the national govern-
ment allowed the Walloons in Wallonia. This
economic shock to Walloon heavy industry
disrupted the old order and is what caused
Judt to remark that “what finally doomed the
unity of Belgium . . . was the reversal of eco-
nomic fortunes” (p. 4) and all its attendant con-
sequences.
What the Flemish viewed as nothing more
than an assertion of their rights was perceived
by the Walloons as a bold quest for statewide
dominance; thus in response the Walloons
started seeking reforms of their own in an effort
to protect themselves from the encroaching
North. The ruling coalition in Parliament in the
early 1960s recognized the need to halt the esca-
lating language war and hammered out a series
of new laws that sought to bolster the Flemish
position while mitigating Walloon concerns.
(Dunn, p. 148) To achieve maximum linguis-
tic homogeneity, the 1932 demarcation line was
slightly modified to allow Flanders and Wallo-
nia to include Flemish- and Walloon-speaking
villages, respectively, that had formerly belonged
to the other side. In terms of education, new
facilities were built in Brussels for the Flem-
ish minority, a move designed to simultaneously
help the Flemish and hurt the francophones, as
this law effectively blocked Flemish parents
from sending their children to French-speaking
schools. At the same time, in attempts to
appease the francophones, the government
established French schools in a handful of com-
munes in the Flanders region outside of Brus-
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sels to provide resident francophones (of which
there were many) a place to send their chil-
dren to receive an education in French.
As often happens, in trying to please every-
one the government pleased no one, or at least
managed to draw the ire of both sides as a result
of the 1960s legislation. Francophones decried
the laws’ infringement on the rights of self-
determination and choosing how to educate
one’s offspring, while the Flemish cried expan-
sionism in protest of the construction of
French-speaking schools in Flanders. In hopes
of putting these flaring passions on the back
burner, in 1966 the Prime Minister declared a
“linguistic truce” (Dunn, p. 149) in order to
focus on other issues at hand. Though it was
effective for a time, it was a university crisis that
brought the truce, and that government, to an
end. (Judt, p. 6)
In 1968 the five-hundred-year-old Catholic
University of Leuven (Katholieke Universiteit
Leuven, or K.U. Leuven [Mnookin, p. 103])
marked the language war’s newest battlefield.
Given Belgium’s history of francophone privilege
in higher education, naturally there remained
many French-speaking university professors and
students at Leuven even after the Flemish lan-
guage was placed on an equal plane with French.
However, to residents of Leuven, a college town
in a Flemish province, the francophone popu-
lation — and worse, the primary schools that
existed to serve this group — constituted an
unlawful commune on their soil. In 1962 it
was revealed that residents not associated with
the university had been sending their children
to the French-speaking schools, a perceived stab
in the back of the Flemish Movement that had
for so long struggled to prove, in reality and by
law, that the Flemish language was equal to
French. (Heisler, p. 43) Demonstrations and
protests on both sides ensued, both within the
community and among university students. In
the end, the university split in two, with the
French section of the university leaving K.U.
Leuven and Flanders for Louvain, a town on
the other side of the linguistic border in a Wal-
loon province, where the French-speaking Uni-
versity of Louvain (Université Catholique de Lou-
vain, or U.C. Louvain [Mnookin, p. 103]) was
established. However, there was still the mat-
ter of the library. In a classic “Belgian compro-
mise,” the two sides split the assets 50–50:
U.C. Louvain took the books with even call num-
bers, while the odd-numbered volumes stayed at
K.U. Leuven. (Mnookin, p. 103)
Intricacies of Belgian Government
The above anecdotal evidence of pragma-
tism speaks to a truth of the larger Belgian story,
where rather than cooperating to find an equi-
table solution, the two groups only seek to
ensure that no advantage, perceived or actual,
is given to the other side. (Fortunately for the
students, the library-splitting arrangement
did ultimately result in an equitable, though
unconventional, distribution of the assets.) Like
the couple in the midst of a bitter divorce, the
two regions want to take what’s his and hers and
keep the contact between them to a minimum,
drawing a “do not cross” line through the living
space. While democratic, all of this amounts
to inefficiency, excess, and waste in various
levels of government, and a populace divided
to the point that they have nothing in com-
mon with those on the other side of the inter-
nal border. (Judt remarks that roads crossing
from another country into Belgium have few
indicators of entrance into a new country, but
within Belgium the names of provinces are
posted prominently. “It is as though conven-
tional arrangements had been inverted: the
country’s international borders are a mere
formality, its internal frontiers imposing and
very real.” [p. 6])
On the heels of the Louvain crisis came the
first major revision to the original constitution.
In 1970 the three regions (Flanders, Wallonia,
and Brussels) and three cultural communities
(Dutch-speaking, French-speaking, and Ger-
man-speaking3) were officially established, with
corresponding governments and competences4
which the separate regional parliaments have
the authority to govern. (Heisler, p. 42) These
competences, devolved to regions and cultural
communities from federal government control,
reflected desires on the part of each group to
have greater power in certain policies, desires
which often came out of fear based on past expe-
riences. Flanders, for example, wanted auton-
omy in linguistic and cultural fields, a natural
desire given the history of the Flemish as a mar-
ginalized group. Walloons, on the other hand,
looking to protect themselves and their status
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against the recent increase in the Flemish
population and economic power, wanted con-
trol over social and economic policies. (Beau-
fays, p. 70) There were no constitutional amend-
ments during the 1970s that satisfied the
Walloons’ wishes, and the goals of the Flemings
continued to expand and deepen. Thus, Belgian
politics is still marked by demands from both
sides over increased competences for regions.
In reality, little remains under federal control
aside from the military and social security,
and the latter is a point of contention between
the regions. This indicates that the impor-
tance of Belgium as a state lies more in its
passive position of allowing lower levels of
government to compete for control than in
any kind of active role in exercising power on its
own terms.
Institutionalized Divisions
While the aforementioned devolution of
the 1970s can be viewed as a victory for the
lower levels of government, the competences
can also be seen as a source of gridlock, making
political decisions needlessly complicated. Any
one issue is likely to involve multiple govern-
ments. For example, regions have control over
energy policy, but the state sets the energy
prices. Boundaries between competences tend
to blur and may overlap. 
Aside from specific issue areas, overlap is
particularly evident when examining the parties
themselves. Rather than a two-party system like
that of the United States, Belgium has two
separate multiple-party systems. For instance,
there are two Christian-Democratic parties, one
to cater to the Flemish and one for the fran-
cophones. While some may argue that the estab-
lishment of these separate systems reflects the
regional divide and serves the citizens’ needs,
the separateness of this structure further rein-
forces these divides. In other words, the rela-
tionship between the institutions and the peo-
ple is circular, and it is difficult to determine the
driving factor. For example, while Billiet, Mad-
dens, and Frognier note the role of the emer-
gence of the two systems as a contributing
factor in the growing division of the country, the
authors later note that the division necessitated
the creation of the two separate party systems
and rendered the former unitary system obso-
lete. (Billiet et al., pp. 913–14)
The answer to the question of which fac-
tor exerts greater influence — the existing
regional divide or the distinct party systems
— matters less than the reality. Belgium is a
country divided, and the replicated political par-
ties are just one manifestation of this fact. The
multiplicity of governments and government
levels make Belgium’s political system one of
the more complicated ones in the world, as well
as one of the more high-priced. The creation
of duplicate governments under the revised con-
stitution of the 1970s — and even the federal-
ization process itself whereby the federal gov-
ernment ceded powers to the regions and
communities — has proved costly, contributing
to the enormity of the national debt men-
tioned earlier. The nature of this multi-layered
setup yields substantial inefficiency. Aside
from issue areas that fall under the domain of
more than one government, the Belgian consti-
tution, in its sensitivity to the demands of the
different ethnicities, enforces quotas, requiring
that a set number of representatives hail from
Flanders and Wallonia so as not to give either
region a numbers advantage. This renders the
decision-making process cumbersome at best,
and effectively reduces the Belgian government
to anti-majoritarian politics.5 (Heisler, p. 43) The
level of exasperation of the eBay author that per-
meates his advertisement noted in the introduc-
tion suggests that perhaps Belgian citizens
would prefer to forgo the strict rules of pro-
portionality in the name of greater governmen-
tal productivity, but of course only if the oppo-
sition were the ones making concessions.
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3Belgium is divided into three language communi-
ties: French, Flemish, and German. The German commu-
nity is located on Belgium’s western border with Germany
and is part of the Wallonian region. (Portal Site . . .) The Bel-
gian constitution accords certain areas of control (i.e.
matters of culture) to the language communities, which are
distinct from Belgium’s three regions: Flanders, Wallonia,
and Brussels.
4The constitutional revisions in the 1970s federalized
the Belgian state, with governments at the national,
regional, and community levels. The central government
underwent the process of devolution, ceding control over
various issue areas to these lower levels and thereby increas-
ing their autonomy from the center. The communities,
for example, have the constitutional authority to create sep-
arate education policies for their citizens without input from
the federal government. The Belgians refer to these domains
of control as “competences.”
Exasperation is running particularly high in
Flanders, where, following the 100th day with-
out a government in the 2007 elections, a Flem-
ish opinion poll showed that a record 46 percent
of the region wants to see Belgium split, and 65
percent think this result will eventually come
to pass. (“Half . . .”)
Importance of Belgian Media
The role of the media ranks high among
visible dividers in today’s Belgium. Ironically,
while technology typically tops the list of fac-
tors that drive globalization and connect more
and more people around the world, technol-
ogy is one of the very elements driving Flanders
and Wallonia apart. Much like their government
arrangements, the regions have confined radio,
television, cinema, and other forms of pop-
culture to their specific spheres. A Fleming
would have little knowledge of, or interest in,
the news or cultural happenings in Wallonia,
and vice versa. A Fleming will read a Flemish
newspaper, listen to a Flemish radio station
on the commute to work, choose among Flem-
ish television programs to watch in the evening,
and go out to see a Flemish movie on the week-
end. This would not seem unusual in other
countries. In the United States, most people get
their news in English. But the situations of
Flanders and Wallonia are unusual when one
considers the fact that they are members of
the same country, one approximately the same
size as the state of Maryland. They reside no
more than 170 miles apart from each other;
yet they have no knowledge of the lives of
those living on the other side of the regional
border. (Encyclopedia of the Nations) When
asked about her feelings on the regional divide,
a Flemish woman responded that she “would
have nothing to talk about” with a Walloon, cit-
ing the lack of common ground in the realm
of popular culture, such as books and movies.
This institutionalized media gap reinforces
other areas of cultural separatism, and for some
it illustrates the impotence of the Belgian state.
As Billiet, Maddens, and Frognier remark, “Even
in bilingual Brussels, the French-speaking
and Dutch-speaking education networks are
entirely separate. This means that the central
Belgian authority has barely any policy instru-
ments to promote or socialise a shared Bel-
gian culture.” (p. 915)
For all the fuss made of the cultural divi-
sion and monolingual media, one would think
that these phenomena had developed rela-
tively recently and indicate some larger social
ill. The fact remains that there is nothing
novel or recent about the ethnic divergence
between the Flemings and the Walloons, and so
the existence of a media gap should surprise
no one and should not hint at the likelihood
of Belgium’s dissolution. Even to the Flemish
woman who could not imagine carrying on a
conversation with a Walloon, the idea of a splin-
tered state was still more unpalatable. Though
many citizens may identify with their region
before their country, this does not necessarily
mean that they want to relinquish their ties to
Belgium.
An Uncertain Future
As Van de Craen notes with a perceptible
air of weariness, “It has been said over and
over again that the country will fall apart, that
there is no need for it to exist, and so on.” (p.
25) Scholars, pundits, and radical political
groups have devoted themselves to this idea.
While a split may not be desired by the major-
ity of the Belgian population as a whole, those
who hint at this so-called imminent breakup
know that they are striking a nerve and giving
life to an idea that, however unlikely it may
seem, is never outside the realm of possibility.
As long as Belgium remains a state and the eth-
nic cleavages remain intact, the question of
the state’s relevance, and lifespan, will continue
to persist.
As of January 2008, Belgium is setting the
record for the number of days without a formed
government, having already broken the coun-
try’s former record of 150 days. The Flemish
parties further stalled the process when on
November 7, 2007, in retaliation for the fran-
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5The Belgian constitution is one that sets out to define
and protect the rights of its various groups, and in the
process gives disproportional control to minority groups.
The tiny German community of just over 70,000 has the
same powers as the larger Flemish and francophone lan-
guage communities, and Flanders and Wallonia are equally
represented in Parliament in spite of unequal populations.
A majority is needed to pass a law in government, but the
system is such that a majority is difficult to obtain.
cophone parties’ refusal to institute greater
regional autonomy, they unilaterally voted to
break up the Brussels electoral district, a move
that Blenkinsop claims “effectively depriv[es]
more than 100,000 French-speaking Brussels
suburbanites of the right to vote for francoph-
one parties.” (p. 2) The Flemish have long agi-
tated for increasing decentralization. A poll from
September 2007 indicates that the separatist
platform of the radical Vlaams Belang party, the
extreme right-wing Flemish nationalist group,
is not so radical anymore. Two-thirds of the
Flemish community think Belgium will even-
tually split, and nearly half desire this outcome.
(“Majority . . .”) 
Even those outside the country are weigh-
ing in: another poll shows that more than fifty
percent of French residents living along the bor-
der would like Wallonia to become part of
France in the event of a breakup. (Balmer) No
one has extended any such offer to the tiny Ger-
man community, the afterthought in the Bel-
gian story, whose members want Belgium to
stay together for reasons of identity, home-
land, and the pampered minority status that the
state grants them. (Codogno)
Whether or not Belgium remains together
rests more in the hands of those in government
than those casting votes in polls. For every
ecstatic Flemish separatist, there is an equally
obstinate Walloon who vows to freeze the pro-
posed bill concerning the future of the Brussels
electorate, whether fragmented and under
Flemish control or status quo and favoring
the francophones. Though population numbers
would hint that the Flemish have the upper
hand, this is not the case in Parliament. As
Didier Reynders, the head of the francophone
Liberals, put it, “The Belgian pact is based on
compromise. In Belgium, you negotiate on
the basis of protecting minorities. A majority of
six million against four, that’s not Belgium any-
more.” (as quoted in Blenkinsop, p. 1) The math
may seem logical, but the Belgian constitu-
tion favors minorities over mathematics. The
state exists less for practical purposes than for
protection, and acts as a framework within
which the various groups can meet to voice
their interests and work out their differences in
a way that would not otherwise be possible.
As one resident of the German community
noted, the three communities share linguistic
ties with the surrounding countries, but the
Flemish are not Dutch, the Walloons are not
French, and the German-speakers are not Ger-
man. (Codogno) For all the separatist talk of a
“greater Netherlands” by right-wing Flemish
politicians, Flanders does not share a great deal
of common ground with the socially liberal
Netherlands. Plus, the Flemish population of
6 million people would revert to minority sta-
tus if absorbed into their northern neighbor,
whose constitution does not take pains to look
after minority interests in the way that Bel-
gium’s does. The Belgian state also affords
extensive constitutional rights to both Flanders
and Wallonia that neither would retain should
they join the Netherlands or France, respec-
tively. Thanks to Belgium’s minority-minded
constitution, these groups are much stronger
inside the Belgian state than they could ever
hope to be outside of it. The case is magnified
in the case of the German and French lan-
guage communities, where the countries who
share their languages have populations several
times larger than that of the entire state of
Belgium. And that is not to say that these coun-
tries would willingly incorporate the leftover
fragments. Just over half of the French citi-
zens along the border were amenable to the
addition of Wallonia; but in a move that would
affect the whole of France, residents all the
way down to the Mediterranean would need to
share in that opinion.
In short, whether happy about it or not,
members of all of these communities — sepa-
rated by language, culture, and a host of other
differences — are Belgian, and Belgium is their
home. This does not mean that there is a pre-
vailing idea of a national Belgian identity; it is
well-documented that there are people in each
region, more in Flanders than in Wallonia, who
place their regional identity on a par with or
even above their national identity. (Billiet, Mad-
dens, and Frognier, p. 915) For some Belgians,
the concept of a national identity is a joke
(Van de Craen, p. 24); for others, it is non-
existent, save for a moment in sporting his-
tory when a Belgian rider won the Tour de
France. (de Heusch, p. 11) On that point, all Bel-
gians seem to agree, and nowhere in the coun-
try will one be badgered into displaying acts of
patriotism. Paradoxically, being a resident of
Belgium does not require one to be Belgian.
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It does not follow that the absence of a
strong national identity will bring about the
eventual death of a state, particularly when
the idea of unity was questionable at the state’s
birth. Indeed, the allowing for the expression of
other identities, whether tied to the region,
community, province, or municipality, and
the ability to fight for those interests are para-
mount and something to be preserved. What
happens within the space can and will change
with the passage of time, so it matters little 
that the idea of a national Belgian identity or
culture is not very strong and therefore not a
unifying feeling. Culture is not a static concept,
but one that evolves over time, regardless of
location. 
In the face of globalization and increas-
ing regional interdependence, nationalism is
losing its potency, particularly in other coun-
tries in the European Union. Just as the idea
of culture is not a constant, neither is the con-
cept of the nation-state. Currently it may be the
preferred method of organization in the inter-
national system, but this is only a moment in
history. Just as the international order evolved
a few centuries ago into one of nation-states, so
another form of order could eventually come to
take its place. With all of the ethnic strife and
subsequent compromise that Belgium has expe-
rienced, it may ultimately fare better in the glob-
alized era than other states who attempt to ward
it off with such futile measures as quotas and
other regulations to artificially protect an
ephemeral culture that will transform in a mat-
ter of decades.
In other words, as Van De Craen puts it,
“Whether or not [Belgium] is falling apart
may well be totally irrelevant.” (p. 26) The
state is not without its problems — the national
debt and the lack of government among them,
as alluded to by the eBay ad — but it is not with-
out purpose. Its reasons for existence may not
fit with the design intent of the original model,
but the original model is increasingly out of
place in contemporary global politics. Bel-
gium has teetered on the brink of disaster more
than once in its history; and the potential costs,
both economic and otherwise, of a split will
likely save it from collapse yet again. Just as the
concept of the nuclear family has evolved, so too
has the conception of the state. Thus, like the
couple who cannot afford the costs and conse-
quences of a divorce or who stay together for the
children, Belgium will take a deep breath, vow
to make the best of it, and stick it out for the
foreseeable future.
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